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How Imperial Is the Supreme Court? An
Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion
Doctrine and Popular Will
By MICHAEL VITELLO*
OUR HISTORY IS replete with attacks on the Supreme Court for
frustrating the will of the majority.' Depending on the era, the at-
tacks have come both from the left and from the right. President
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, for example, was a reaction to the
several Supreme Court decisions striking down New Deal legislation-
legislation presumably supported by a majority of Americans. 2 More
recently, the sharpest criticism of the Court has come from the right.
Introduction
Former Judge Robert Bork voiced current anti-Court sentiment
when he stated that, 'Judicial activism is likely to represent an elite
minority's sentiment."3 Similarly, other conservatives have attacked
the Court as elitist, socially permissive, and out of touch with the ma-
jority of Americans.4 Criticism has come from within the Court as well.
Justice Scalia has accused the Court of substituting its will for that of
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University of Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to extend special
thanks to Dean Gerald Caplan for his continued support of scholarship at McGeorge. I am
also appreciative of the excellent research assistance and feedback provided by Lesley C.
Barlow, Jenna L. Clark, Dale R. Gomes, and Maria Salazar-Sperber and of Ms. Clark's
special efforts in pushing the project to completion.
1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (declaring that "[t]he Imperial Judiciary lives").
2. SeeJOHN E. NOwAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 147-48 (3rd ed. 1986). President
Roosevelt's proposal was entitled "Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary." See S. 1392,
75th Cong. (1937).
3. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 17 (1990).
4. SeeJeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the Culture Wars, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 105 (1998);
see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Supreme Court is a participant in the "culture wars" that divide America and that "in these
conflicts, the Court is a systematic partisan for one side-the liberal side").
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the voters. In Romer v. Evans,5 he accused the Court of "imposing
upon all Americans" the values of "the elite class from which the Mem-
bers of this institution are selected."'6 Like Bork, Scalia sees America
engaged in a cultural war in which the Supreme Court sides with the
elite class and is thus at odds with the majority of Americans. 7
Long ago, Justice Frankfurter urged the Supreme Court to act
with restraint in order to preserve its limited popular support.8
Although the Court's critics cite no empirical support for their view,9
the Court often ignores the claim that its rulings lack popular sup-
port.10 The traditional defense disregards the fact that, despite the
rhetoric, the Court cannot frustrate the majority will often or for pro-
longed periods of time. Various institutional or constitutional factors
prevent the Court from straying too far from popular will.1 '
The current attack on the Court runs as follows: insofar as the
justices subscribe to the notion of a living Constitution, the Court is
not constrained by constitutional text or history. Thus, justices substi-
tute their preferences for those of duly elected legislatures and
thereby deprive Court rulings of legitimacy.12 This article challenges
the critics' claim in reference to one particularly controversial area of
the law-abortion.
Through analysis of opinion polls over the last quarter-century,
this article concludes that the attack on the Court is unfounded. 13
While Court doctrine on abortion does not entirely mirror public
opinion, it does significantly reflect popular will.14 In fact, where pub-
5. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Rabkin, supra note 4, at 105.
8. See Mary B. McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of 'Our Federalism, '27 GAL.
REV. 697, 731-37, 780-83 (1993) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial
restraint); but see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism, 92 Nw. U.L. REv.
251, 276-77 (1997) (stating that Frankfurter used restraint selectively, depending on the
issue before the Court); see also Fred Rodell, Book Review, 59 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014-15
(1950) (stating that Frankfurter used restraint selectively).
9. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also BoRx, supra note 3, passim.
10. See discussion infra Part I.B.
11. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
12. See BoRK, supra note 3, at 46 (noting that, "[t] here was no Justice on the Court
who was not prepared to substitute his opinions for those of elected representatives at
some point").
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See id.
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lic opinion is clearest, the Supreme Court doctrine is most likely to
parallel that sentiment.15
This conclusion is important because it supports the wisdom of
the creation of an independent judiciary. Repeated attacks on the
Court as anti-majoritarian risk eroding public support for an in-
dependent judiciary. This attack is especially dangerous in the emo-
tionally charged abortion debate.
Part I of this article discusses the critique of the Supreme Court
as an anti-majoritarian institution. Part II shows the development and
current state of the Supreme Court's abortion case law. Part III dis-
cusses the adequacy of using public opinion polls to measure majority
sentiment. Part IV compares the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine
with polling results over time and concludes that a majority of Ameri-
cans have supported the general scheme of the Supreme Court's abor-
tion doctrine.
I. The Anti-Majoritarian Debate
To hear Justice Scalia 16 or Robert Bork 17 tell it, the Supreme
Court acts with little legitimacy because it routinely frustrates the will
of the majority when it strikes down popular legislation. The Court's
defenders concede this point, but defend the Court as an institution
designed to protect minority rights.18 This section reviews this debate
and argues that however desirable it may be to have a court positioned
to protect "discrete and insular minorities" 19 unable to achieve polit-
ical power, the Court is far less anti-majoritarian than its critics claim.
The debate surrounding the Court often contrasts independent Arti-
cle IIIjudges,20 considered members of the elite, with the legislature,
considered the true measure of popular sentiment. 21 In fact, the legis-
lature often acts contrary to popular will. Failure to recognize that the
15. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
16. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. See BoK, supra note 3, at 16-17.
18. See infra note 34.
19. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
20. Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1120-21 (1977)
(stating that, "the federal judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures makes federal
court structurally preferable to state trial court"), with Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial
Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983) (arguing that empirical data suggest parity
between state and federal judges in their willingness to enforce federal rights).
21. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520-21 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) [hereinafter Akron II].
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Court does in fact follow majority will leaves the Court open to power-
ful attack that may undercut its effectiveness. 22
A. The Attacks: The Supreme Court Frustrates Majority Wil
At various times in our history, Congress and the President, frus-
trated by rulings of the Supreme Court, have proposed legislation
aimed at undercutting the authority of the federal courts. President
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, 23 various proposals in the 1950s
and 1960s ranging from desegregation to school prayer and busing,2 4
designed to undo Warren Court decisions, and a host of similar stat-
utes in the early Reagan years share a common thesis: 25 the Article III
judiciary is politically unaccountable and often frustrates the will of
the majority.
No doubt, the Court has acted contrary to majoritarian senti-
ment. Doing justice in a given case may demand a blind eye towards
popular will.26 For example, assuring that the government provides
due process to a death row inmate may frustrate majoritarian senti-
ment. The fact that the Supreme Court repeatedly acted in contraven-
tion of popular will in striking down New Deal legislation in the mid-
1930s is beyond serious historical debate. Furthermore, a majority of
Americans undoubtedly opposed many of the Warren Court decisions
that bound the States to specific protections found in the Bill of
Rights.
Even the Court's sharpest critics recognize a role for judicial in-
dependence and do not contend the Court must always respond to
22. See discussion infra Part IV; see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting; joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); see
also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting).
23. See NowAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 147-48. President Roosevelt's proposal was enti-
tled "Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary." See S. 1392, 75th Cong. (1937).
24. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 58-59 (9th ed.
1975); see also Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 ViL. L. REv. 988, 988 (1981-82).
25. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opin-
ionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895-96 (1984) (discussing Con-
gressional proposals aimed at curbing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in light
of dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions, and particularly mentioning abortion and
busing).
26. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 751, 751 (1986) (noting that the courts must decide cases free from popular
pressure).
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popular sentiment.27 Instead, their contention is that, because activist
justices are not constrained by the text or original meaning of the
Constitution, those justices are substituting their own value prefer-
ences for those of the majority.28 According to Bork and other critics,
substituting the values of the cultural elite is not legitimate because
those values lack constitutional or majoritarian support.29 Often, the
critics cite Roe v. Wade30 and the Supreme Court's privacy case law as
prime examples of the justices' substitution of their values for those of
the majority.31
In fact, few issues have generated such constant attack on the
Court as abortion. The criticism began with Justice White's dissent in
Roe which characterized the majority's holding as "an exercise of raw
judicial power."3 2 Since then, criticism of Roe has focused on a
number of arguments. Chief among these criticisms has been the
claim that unelected judges have frustrated the majority's will as re-
flected in state anti-abortion legislation.33 The portrayal of unelected,
27. See id at 752 ("No such judge can conscientiously say in so many words, 'I gave you
my best judgment when I decided that the Constitution meant thus and so, but since the
public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution, I will there-
fore change my mind'").
28. See BoRK, supra note 3, at 170. Bork states:
Again, the idea is not that judges should feel free to alter the composition of the
House of Representatives or decide that senatorial elections should occur every
two years but that they should be free to create new individual rights and so strike
down legislation that would be valid under the Constitution as written.
Id.
29. See id. at 171 ("The dead, and unrepresentative, men who enacted our Bill of
Rights and the Civil War amendments did not thereby forbid us, the living, to add new
freedoms. We remain entirely free to create all the additional freedoms we want by consti-
tutional amendment or by simple legislation . .
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. See BoR, supra note 3, at 169 ("Roe became possible only because Griswold had
created a new right, and anyone who reads Griswold can see that it was not an adjustment of
an old principle to a new reality but the creation of a new principle by tour de force or, less
politely, by sleight of hand").
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
33. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVEN-
TIES 33-46 (1979) (arguing that federal judges have frustrated majority sentiment reflected
in state anti-abortion laws in effect in every state); see also ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL.,
BETWEEN Two ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 14 (1992) (con-
cluding that "there is some evidence that the Roe decision had a moderate polarizing effect
on public opinion"); Basile J. Uddo, The Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn Through Con-
gressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Lov. L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 (1981) (stat-
ing that, "abortion was foisted upon the American people by an unelected, life-tenured
judiciary, and not adopted by the deliberate workings of the more representative political
process").
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anti-majoritarian judges thwarting the will of the people is powerful
political rhetoric.
B. The Defense: Limiting Judicial Power
The Court's defenders emphasize the role of federal courts in
protecting minority rights.34 Rather than challenging the assumption
that the Court is anti-majoritarian, the Court's defenders concede the
point and argue instead that the role of the Court is defending "dis-
crete and insular minorities"35 from the tyranny of the majority. The
Framers of the Constitution created an independent judiciary in or-
der to prevent mob rule from overriding individual liberty. 36 Most
commentators, even the Court's sharpest critics, recognize that in
some instances the judiciary must frustrate the public will in order to
do substantial justice.37
Unquestionably, the Court should have the power to do justice
that may conflict with the will of the majority. However, the percep-
tion that federal courts are routinely out of touch with majoritarian
34. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite
Justice Scalia's scathing dissent in which he accuses the majority of elitism and the imposi-
tion of their will upon all Americans, the majority failed to respond to his criticism. In
some sense, the majority must remain silent in the face of such accusations. It would be
inappropriate to respond that "we are listening carefully to the majority of Americans
before we decide the dispute before us." To do so would suggest that the Court was decid-
ing the case based on political rather than legal considerations.
In Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souterjusti-
fled their decision to reaffirm Roe by reference to settled expectations. See Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 855-56 (1992). ButJustices Stevens and Blackmun saw no need to justify the abortion
cases by reference to popular sentiment. See id. at 911-22 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting); see id. at 922-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
Where the Court has spoken on the subject, for example in cases involving "discrete
and insular minorities," the Court seems to take the position that, because the particular
minority group has been deprived of political power, the legislation, not the Court, lacks
democratic legitimacy. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv.
713, 716-17 (1985). Many commentators have struggled to reconcile the Court's power to
overturn legislation with democratic theory. See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P.
Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil
Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 686 (1991) (discussing how Justice Scalia used Acker-
man's theory); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-6 (2d ed. 1988).
Many of those efforts fail to recognize that instances of the Court's anti-majoritarian hold-
ings are far fewer than generally assumed. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democ-
racy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 283 (1957).
35. Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
36. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that the republican
form of government avoids the evils of factions and the tyranny of the majority or
minority).
37. See Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 751 (1986) (recognizing that no conscientious
judge should change his or her mind simply based on overwhelming public disagreement).
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sentiment has at times threatened a backlash against the Court.38 Ar-
guing that the Constitution empowers the judiciary to protect minor-
ity rights concedes too much to the Court's critics.
The Court's critics overstate both the Court's immunity from
majoritarian influences and the extent to which the Court strays from
majority sentiment. Frequent use of such power cannot be squared
with democracy and almost certainly undercuts the Court's legitimacy
when it does act contrary to the majority. As Robert Dahl observes,
"no amount of tampering with democratic theory can conceal the fact
that a system in which the policy preferences of minorities prevail over
majorities is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguishing a
democracy from other political systems."39 Failure to rebut the Court's
critics is an unnecessary concession that the Court is anti-majoritarian
and worthy of popular distrust.
Certainly, the Constitution creates the opportunity for an in-
dependent judiciary. Article III affords lifetime tenure for all federal
judges.40 The Framers intended Article III to increase the quality of
justice by protecting judges from political reprisals.41 Our constitu-
tional government is a republic, not a democracy-a fact reflected in
numerous constitutional protections.42 An independent judiciary is
one such protection; it allows reflective decision making, free from
the passions of the moment.43 The Framers designed an independent
judiciary as one check on mob rule, the ugly side of democracy. 44
38. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 147-48 (discussing President Roosevelt's propo-
sal to increase the size of the Supreme Court); see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying
text; Michael Vitiello and Andrew J. Glendon, Article IIIJudges and the Initiative Process: Are
Article IIIJudges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (1998) (suggesting that
"[t]he most draconian demand is the repeal of the lifetime tenure provisions of Article
III") (citing H.R.J. Res. 77, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing that an Article III judge may not
hold office for more than 10 years without the consent of the Senate)).
39. Dahl, supra note 34, at 283.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
41. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[F] rom the natural feebleness
of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its
co6rdinate branches; and.., nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and indepen-
dence as permanency in office."); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 50-52 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing policy
favoring Article III over legislative courts).
42. Various Constitutional protections make our system a republic and thus not fully
democratic. For example, each state is afforded two Senators regardless of the size of the
State's population. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. Also, the President is not elected by majority
vote but rather by electoral votes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. See REDISH, supra note 41, at 8.
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Judicial review strengthens the power of the Court to protect mi-
nority interests. Unpopular decisions are reviewable only by the
Court's own reexamination of its doctrine or by the difficult amend-
ment process. 4 5 But the idea that federal judges are immune from
political reality is wrong as a matter of constitutional design and as a
matter of common sense. Common sense tells us that judges are
human beings who, as one commentator has said, "'follow[ ] the elec-
tion returns.' "46
While the Court retains power over the Executive and Legislative
branches through judicial review,47 the political branches hold sway
over the Court beyond their respective roles in the nomination and
confirmation process. Congress must allocate resources for the Court
to function. 48 The Court has virtually no independent enforcement
power and must rely on the co-operation of the executive branch of
the government to enforce its decrees if the parties do not voluntarily
comply. 49 The fact that the President nominates ajustice and the Sen-
ate ratifies that choice allows an opportunity for the political branches
of government to influence the direction of the Court.50
Battles over the personal views of Court nominees, which have
been especially visible in our recent history,5 1 are ample demonstra-
tion that the legislative and executive branches have a voice in di-
recting the Court. The possibility that a Justice may disappoint the
45. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress....
Id.
46. Eric M. Uslaner & Ronald E. Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in
the Nation and States: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe Decisions, 77 MICH. L. REv.
1772, 1772 (1979) (quoting R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
xiv (1970)).
47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
49. See Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 38, at 1297.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties .... and he ... shall appoint...
Judges of the [S]upreme [C]ourt ...." ).
51. See Louis FISHER ET AL., POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 206-10
(1992) (stating that the Senate questioned Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and
David Souter about their views on the right to privacy, in particular, Roe v. Wade).
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President who nominated him or her5 2 does not refute the fact that
the political branches have an opportunity to influence the Court.
And despite great debate over proper criteria for selection of a justice
during the Bork nomination, 53 the Framers almost certainly expected
the political branches of government to consider a nominee's views in
making the selection. 54
While some presidents have selected youthful justices,55 most
presidents have appointed established lawyers.56 Because of that fact,
in part, and the number of members of the Court, virtually every pres-
ident is assured at least one appointment.57 The current Court is com-
posed of justices appointed by five different presidents with widely
varied political agendas.58 The result is that, over relatively short peri-
52. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Leak on Souter Keeps McGuigan in Play, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 10,
1990, at 10-11 (explaining that President Eisenhower was disappointed in Justice
Brennan).
53. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Balance Favoring Restraint, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 15
(1987-88) (using the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork as an example, the author
urges that ideology should play a narrow role in the Senate's consideration of Supreme
Court nominees); see also Phillip B. Heymann & Fred Wertheimer, Why the United States
Senate Should Not Consent to the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be a justice of the Supreme Court, 9
CARDOZo L. REv. 21, 22 (1987-88) (noting that because Bork's "nomination represent[ed]
a radical rejection of much of the Court's work," Common Cause took the "rare step of
opposing a judicial nominee").
54. See Robert Nagel, A Comment on Democratic Constitutionalism, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1027,
1029-30 (1987).
'In a world that knows that a man's social philosophy shapes his judicial behavior,
that philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will
make a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator
can do right only by treating thisjudgment of his, unencumbered by deference to
the President's, as a satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote.'
Id (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657, 663-64 (1970)).
55. See THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 1908-1910 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (showing the ages of
former and current Supreme CourtJustices. The ages of some of the youngest appointees
are: Douglas, J., 40 years old; Stewart, J., 43 years old; Thomas, J., 43 years old; Rehnquist,
C.J., 47 years old); see also EDWARD LAzARus, CLOSED CHAMBERs 228 (1998) ("Reagan suc-
ceeded in naming a cadre of unusually young, often enormously gifted ideologues to fill
his large reservoir of judicial vacancies").
56. See THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS, supra note 55, at 1908-1910 (noting that the ages of some of the older appoin-
tees are: Blackmun, J., 61 years old; Powell, J., 64 years old; Ginsburg, J., 60 years old;
Warren, C.J., 62 years old).
57. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 284.
58. Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed by President Nixon as a Justice of the
Court and by President Reagan as Chief Justice; Justice Stevens, by President Ford; Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, by President Reagan;Justices Souter and Thomas, by Presi-
dent Bush; Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, by President Clinton. See THE JUSTICES OF THE
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ods of time, the political branches of government have an opportunity
to reshape the Court and to bring it closer to majoritarian sentiment.
Professor Dahl has argued that upholding minority interests over
those of national majorities would make the Court "an extremely
anomalous institution from a democratic point of view."59 In Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
Dahl attempts to measure the extent to which the Court has been able
to create policy inconsistent with the will of the national majority.60
He concludes that "law-making majorities generally have had their
way." 61 In a "very small number of important cases," the Court
"delayed the application of policy up to as much as twenty-five years,"
but never "succeeded in holding out indefinitely." 62 While some
Supreme Court decisions are contrary to the will of the majority, if
Dahl's findings are correct, the Court's critics are wrong when they
characterize the institution as counter-majoritarian.
C. Preference for Legislative Action: Overstating Legislation as an
Expression of the Will of the Majority
Critics of the Court assume that state legislation better reflects
majority sentiment than a decision of an Article III court striking
down that legislation. For example, Judge Bork has stated that,
"[1] egislation is far more likely to reflect majority sentiment while judi-
cial activism is likely to represent an elite minority's sentiment."6 3
The preference for legislative action ignores a number of ways in
which legislation may not reflect majoritarian will. Few legislators are
selected for their views on a single issue. 64 Low voter turnout means
that, even if voters select a candidate based on his or her views on a
particular issue, that representative's vote on a particular bill may not
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS, supra note 55, at
1910-11.
59. Dahl, supra note 34, at 291.
60. See id. at 282.
61. Id, at 291.
62. Id,
63. BORK, supra note 3, at 17; see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) (stating that a "democratic society does not.., need constitutional
guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect 'current values.' Elections take care of that
quite well"); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court
has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from
which members of this institution are selected ... ).
64. CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES 231 (1989)
("[C]ontrol of Congress and the presidency is based upon coalitions of alliances of...
[the] interests" of "the law-making majority").
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reflect the prevailing sentiment.65 Few question that money may skew
election results, again making less certain a relationship between pop-
ular will and the views of elected officials.66 Another reality is that
many representatives respond to vocal minorities,6 7 organized groups
which flood a representative's office with correspondence favorable to
their positions. 68 Gerrymandered voting districts may sap the political
strength of the majority,69 as may a gubernatorial 70 or presidential
veto. 7 1
Thus, the critics' dichotomy between legislation and Court rul-
ings is simplistic. They overstate the Court's ability and willingness to
depart from majoritarian sentiment and ignore ways in which legisla-
tors frustrate the will of the populace.
Many of these modern critics see Roe as prime evidence that the
Court is anti-majoritarian. 72 After all, in 1973, despite some liberaliza-
tion of state abortion law, no state had a law on the books as permis-
sive as Roe.7 3 Since that time, the Court has frequently struck down
state laws regulating abortion.74 After a review of twenty-five years
worth of abortion cases, this article attempts to measure majoritarian
views on abortion to see whether the Court has in fact deviated from
popular will. 75 For the reasons discussed in this section, the author's
65. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 283-84.
66. See Dan Baltz, Clinton Defends Satellite Waiver, WASH. POST, May 18, 1998, at Al
(reporting that Bill Clinton denied foreign policy decisions affecting China were influ-
enced by political contributions); see also Not from Companies, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 22,
1998, at A20 (stating that "a torrential flow of money in politics makes public service an
endless chase for funds, keeps many qualified people from taking part, and skews legisla-
tion in favor of economic interests").
67. See COOK ET AL., supra note 33, at 199-200.
68. See id.
69. See William Booth & William Claiborne, Lt. Governor Wins Primary in California;
Rich Democrats Lag in Bids for Governor, WASH. POST, June 3, 1998, at Al (commenting that
the California race is especially important because the governor will control reapportion-
ment of congressional districts after the 2000 consensus); see also Ralph Z. Hallow, GOP's
Nervous in California Success in Gubernatorial Primary May Backfire in November, WASH. TIMES,
June 2, 1998, at A6 (noting that the election is "about three things: reapportionment,
reapportionment, reapportionment"); Dave Lesher, California and the West, Stakes Grow
Higher in Race for Governor Politics, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 15, 1998, at A3 (noting that if
democrats continue to hold their majority in the California legislature, Republicans fear
lawmakers could join forces with a democratic governor and adopt a new map of political
districts that weakens GOP chances substantially).
70. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14; LA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
72. See BORK, supra note 3; see also NOONAN, supra note 33.
73. See NOONAN, supra note 33, at 33-34.
74. See CooK ET AL., supra note 33, at 2.
75. See discussion infra Parts II and IV.
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hypothesis prior to collecting data was that the abortion cases would,
in fact, closely represent the will of the majority. The research substan-
tiates this position.
II. The Abortion Doctrine
This section reviews Supreme Court abortion case law over the
past twenty-five years.76 Polling organizations have canvassed the pub-
lic on several issues, most notably: the general right to an abortion, 77
informed consent, 78 parental79 and spousal80 notification, and public
funding.81 This section discusses the Court's holdings in these areas.
A. The Right to an Abortion
For the first time in 1973, the Supreme Court held that a wo-
man's constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses the
right to terminate a pregnancy.82 The Court held that the federal
courts should apply strict scrutiny to legislation outlawing abortion. 83
Although the source of that right has generated controversy,84 Roe and
its defenders ground it in the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
76. Polling data does not address methods of abortion. Therefore, these issues are not
included in this inquiry. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 75-79 (1976) (addressing the state legislature's regulation of abortion methods); see
also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health [hereinafter Akron I], 462 U.S.
416, 436-38 (1983) (discussing the state legislature's regulation of abortion procedures).
77. See THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, July, 1992, at 52.
78. See THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 34.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 35.
81. See Larry Hugick, Abortion: Majority Critical of Abortion Decision, but Most Americans
Favor Some New Restrictions, THE GALLUP REPORT, July 1989, at 10.
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
84. See BORK, supra note 3, at 169-70 (stating that the Court found a right to abortion
in the constitution without explaining even once how that right could be derived from any
constitutional materials); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting) (quot-
ing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)):
[T]he asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ...
To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Justice
Scalia, dissenting) (stating that "the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the
word 'liberty' must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a
collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
choice").
[Vol. 34
THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY
interest.8 5 Even from its first articulation in Roe, a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy has never been absolute.8 6 The Court ac-
knowledged a legitimate state interest in preserving and protecting
maternal health and the potential life of the unborn child.8 7 Roe cre-
ated a trimester framework to explain the balance between these vari-
ous interests.8
During the first trimester, the decision to terminate a pregnancy
rests solely with the woman and her physician.89 Maternal health sim-
ply cannot justify the state's interference with the woman's right to an
abortion in light of data suggesting that mortality in abortion may be
less than mortality in normal childbirth.90 At the end of the first tri-
mester, according to the Court, a state may regulate abortion as long
as the regulation "reasonably relates to the preservation and protec-
tion of maternal health."91 During the final trimester, at the point
when a fetus becomes viable, a state may impose significant regula-
tions based on its compelling interest in protecting a potential life.9 2
The Court recognized a state's right to proscribe abortion during the
third trimester except when necessary to protect the life or health of
the mother.9 3
Roe has been the subject of some of the most scathing criticism of
any Supreme Court decision.9 4 Efforts to overturn Roe have galvanized
a large segment of the population and have changed many historical
voting patterns. Many Catholic voters-largely Democratic voters in
this century-have joined historically apolitical, fundamentalist Chris-
tians in an effort to overturn Roe.95 This new voting block found a
85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50 (O'Connor, J., joint opinion); TRBE, supra note 34,
§ 15-10, at 1341.
86. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting that "[t]he privacy right involved, therefore, can-
not be said to be absolute." At some point in pregnancy, the state's interests in safeguard-
ing health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life, "become
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion
decision").
87. See id at 162-63.
88. See id
89. See id
90. See id
91. Id
92. See id
93. See id at 163-64.
94. See Bork, supra note 3, at 169; see also NOONAN, supra note 33, at 46; COOK ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 2.
95. See COOK ET AL., supra note 33, at 101 (noting that, in regard to their attitudes on
legalized abortion, "Catholics and evangelicals were nearly identical by the end of the
decade").
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home in the Republican party, despite pro-choice majorities within
the Republican party.96
Ronald Reagan, owing his election in large part to the Christian
right,9 7 made a judicial candidate's position on abortion a litmus
test.98 George Bush, although perhaps not as single minded as his
predecessor, demonstrated a similar commitment to the anti-abortion
electorate. 99 Senate judiciary hearings on Supreme Court nominees
became national debates on the abortion question with the nominees'
positions on Roe the topic of many questions, 100 usually finessed by the
nominee.10 1 Together with Roe dissenter Justice Rehnquist, Reagan's
and Bush's five appointees' 0 2 gave the Court enough votes to overrule
Roe.103
96. See Bob Dole's Independence Day, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1996, at 19 (noting that "[i]n
states up and down the country, from Minnesota to South Carolina, opponents of abortion
have seized control of local Republican parties." Currently, the Republican platform op-
poses all abortion and calls for a constitutional amendment to outlaw it); see also Intensity
Gives Anti-Abortionists a Political Edge, CNN television broadcast, May 9, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File (finding that Polls show most Republicans actually
support abortion rights, but abortion opponents have an enormous amount of power be-
cause of their intensity and commitment. The abortion issue is more likely to drive their
vote. The 12% of voters who said abortion was the number one issue when voting drive the
vote. They don't just hold an opinion, they vote their opinions); Republican Diversity over
Abortion Rights is Complex, National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 20, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File (stating that a recent Wall Street Journal poll con-
firms that despite there being a substantial majority of Republicans who favor legal abor-
tion, fierce anti-abortion language has been written into the past four Republican
presidential platforms because the pro-life minority continues to control).
97. See Christian Right About to Turn Tables on Republicans, Hous. CHRON., June 12,
1998, at A: Outlook (stating that Christian political activists helped sweep Ronald Reagan
and George Bush to the White House in the 1980s); see also Reagan Redux, MOTHERJONES,
Nov./Dec., 1998, at 27 (reporting that Ronald Reagan was the candidate of the Christian
Right).
98. See LAZARUS, supra note 55, at 376-79.
99. See LAZARUS, supra note 55, at 373.
100. See id. at 441 (referring to Souter,J.); see also FISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 206-10
(noting that senators questioned Bork and Souter about their views on privacy).
101. See LAZARUS, supra note 55, at 255 (noting that at the Senate hearings, "Kennedy
followed a script that would become standard for future nominees: he endorsed the idea
that the Constitution included some sort of right to privacy but retreated to meaningless
platitudes when pressed to define how extensive that right would be"); see also id, at 453
(noting that during his Senate hearings, "Thomas took the now standard avoidance of the
Roe question to new heights of disingenuousness").
102. Reagan appointed the followingJustices:J. O'Connor, 1981;J. Scalia, 1986;J. Ken-
nedy, 1988; President Bush appointed the following Justices: J. Thomas, 1991; J. Souter,
1990. See THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS, supra note 55, at 1910-11.
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-78 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The Court has twice failed, however, to garner a majority to over-
rule Roe. Sixteen years after Roe and after three Reagan appointments
to the Court,10 4 the Supreme Court faced a direct challenge to Roe in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.10 5 The Missouri legislation at is-
sue in Webster included a preamble setting forth the legislature's find-
ings "that '[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,' and
that 'unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being."' 1 0 6 The legislation's drafters aimed both findings at un-
dercutting Roe's central tenets.10 7 The statute also included a provision
forcing doctors to determine the state of fetal development, 0 8 a provi-
sion anti-abortion proponents drafted to undercut Roe's trimester
scheme.109
A divided Court declined to overrule Roe," 0 but the opinion left
Roe's future uncertain. Four dissenting justices made clear their con-
tinuing support for Roe."I Justice O'Connor, who gave the Chief Jus-
tice a fifth vote to uphold the statute, refused to reach the core
question of the continuing constitutional vitality of Roe v. Wade.112
Two changes in Court personnel" 3 and a plausible reading of Justice
O'Connor's pivotal opinions in recent abortion cases" 4 left Roe espe-
104. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy were appointed during this time period.
See THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIvEs AND MAJOR OPIN-
IONS, supra note 55, at 1910-11.
105. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
106. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205(1) (2) (1986)) (alteration
in original).
107. See LAzARus, supra note 55, at 377.
108. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 501 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.029 (1986)) (noting that
the physician is required to ascertain whether "the fetus is viable by performing 'such med-
ical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age,
weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child'").
109. See LAZARUS, supra note 55, at 377 (suggesting that "in an effort to break down
Roes trimester framework, the state commanded that when a doctor had reason to believe
a fetus was twenty weeks into gestation (well before the third trimester), that doctor must
perform tests to determine whether the fetus was viable").
110. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 521.
111. The four dissenting Justices who maintained clear support for Roe were Marshall,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting); see id. at 560 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
112. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 525. "When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abor-
tion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time
enough to reexamine Roe." Id. at 526.
113. Justices Souter and Thomas were appointed by President Bush. See WILLIAM CO-
HEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 1718 (10th ed.
1997).
114. SeeAkron I, 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1982) (O'Connor,J., dissenting); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-33 (1986)
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cially vulnerable. So vulnerable was Roe that a three judge panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Roe's strict scrutiny
standard was no longer good law.115
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey' 16 regulated abortion through a variety of
means, including informed consent provisions,1 7 a twenty-four hour
waiting period requirement,1 8 and parental notification for mi-
nors.119 The Third Circuit's analysis would have been different had it
employed the prevailing strict scrutiny analysis, rather than the undue
burden test the panel now thought the Court favored. 20 Thus, the
Pennsylvania legislation did not directly call Roe's core protection into
question. Counsel for Planned Parenthood decided to do so when she
asked the Supreme Court to grant writ of certiorari to review a single
question: "Has the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, holding that
a woman's right to choose abortion is a fundamental right protected
by the United States Constitution?" 21
Casey produced no majority opinion. Apparently, Chief Justice
Rehnquist assigned himself the majority opinion with the belief that
he now had sufficient votes, if not to overrule, at least to eviscerate
Roe's protection of abortion rights. 122 During post-argument machina-
tions, he lost Justice Kennedy's vote and ended up writing a concur-
ring opinion in which he urged the Court to employ only a rational
basis test to determine the constitutionality of state laws regulating
abortion. 23 A rational basis test would have allowed considerable reg-
ulation of abortion, effectively overruling Roe. Even by recent stan-
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-901
(1992).
115. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687-97 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating that, since the strict scrutiny test of Roe no longer commanded a court majority, it
should no longer be applied).
116. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
117. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (discussing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).
118. See id. at 885.
119. See id at 899-900.
120. See LAzA.us, supra note 55, at 459. "[T ] he Third Circuit announced that, because
Roe's central premise-its high-wattage 'strict' judicial scrutiny test for abortion regula-
tions-no longer commanded a Court majority, it should no longer be applied." Id, It
substituted O'Connor's undue burden test for strict scrutiny and "tried to guess how she
would evaluate it." Id. If they had evaluated the statute under strict scrutiny, "all would have
failed." IM at 460.
121. Id at 461-62.
122. See id. at 468.
123. See id. at 472, 482.
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dards, 124 Casey divided-no, splintered-the Court. Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter delivered a joint opinion,12 5 most sections of
which gained differing majorities. Justices Blackmun12 6 and Stevens 127
concurred in part and dissented in part. They disagreed with the joint
opinion's imposition of a new standard by which state legislation
would be judged.128 Most importantly, they disagreed with the aban-
donment of Roe's trimester analysis. 129
The joint opinion came as a surprise to most Court watchers be-
cause the three-justice block prevented the expected overruling of
Roe.130 The analysis of the joint opinion did, however, give states
greater freedom to regulate abortion.
The opinion reexamined Roe and, while not explicitly stating that
it was doing so, it substituted a more flexible undue burden test for
the strict scrutiny test applied in earlier cases.13' It fastened onto Roe's
articulation of the state's "important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life,"1 3 2 an aspect of Roe ignored in
subsequent decisions which subjected all regulations to strict scru-
tiny.' 33 At least some of those cases could not "be reconciled with the
holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in the health
of the woman and in protecting potential life within her."1 34
The joint opinion summarized a number of the important points
governing abortion regulations. First, a court must examine abortion
regulation to determine whether it imposes an "undue burden" on a
124. See Kenneth R. Wing, The Principles & Principals of Abortion Compromise, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L. 967, 968 (1993) (noting that "[b]y the late 1980s, the disputes
among the justices in abortion cases had become markedly divisive and antagonistic");
MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Stare
Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 69 (1993) (noting that Casey revealed
deep seated divisions within the Rehnquist court regarding "whether the Constitution pro-
tects the right to have an abortion and about the role of precedent in constitutional
decisionmaking").
125. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
126. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 922.
127. See id at 911.
128. See id. at 920-23 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
129. See id. at 914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 929-35
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (urging that, "Roe's requirement of strict scru-
tiny as implemented through a trimester framework should not be disturbed").
130. See Gerhardt, supra note 124, at 69 (noting that Court watchers expected the over-
ruling of Roe with Casey but the unexpected happened-a bare majority, including Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, expressly reaffirmed Roe).
131. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
132. I& at 871 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
133. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
134. Id.
Fall 1999]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability.13 5 Sec-
ond, Roe's trimester analysis no longer governs abortion cases. The
joint opinion specified that, in order to advance its profound interest
in potential life, the state may adopt measures to assure that the wo-
man's choice is fully informed and may attempt to persuade the wo-
man to choose childbirth over abortion.13 6 Third, health and safety
measures are proper unless they have the purpose or effect of present-
ing a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. 137 Fourth,
the justices reaffirmed Roe's central holding that a woman has a right
to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetal viability. 138 Lastly, with re-
gard to post-viability, the state may regulate or proscribe abortion, ex-
cept where necessary for preservation of the life or health of the
mother. 139
As observed by Justice Blackmun, if the various regulations had
been subject to strict scrutiny, the Court would have found all of the
regulations unconstitutional.1 40 Hence, to some extent, Casey signaled
a compromise between a rigid application of Roe's standards and ef-
forts to overrule it. Even with regard to Roe's core protection, the joint
opinion underscored that, although abortion remains a woman's
choice, it is subject to some significant lobbying by the state. 141
B. Informed Consent
Three years after Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,142 the Supreme Court upheld Missouri's informed consent
provision.143 At a minimum, Danforth demonstrated the Court would
allow some limited regulation of abortion. Danforth found the in-
formed consent provision not only "desirable," but "imperative."144
Missouri's informed consent law was similar to the informed consent
135. See id at 886.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 874 (holding that, "[o]nly where State regulation imposes an undue bur-
den on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause").
138. See id at 846.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that under the
strict scrutiny standard, "the Pennsylvania statute's provisions requiring content-based
counseling, a 24-hour delay, informed parental consent, and reporting of abortion-related
information must be invalidated").
141. See id. at 846.
142. 428 U.S. 52 (1975).
143. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
144. Id.
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required by other medical procedures in that the physician deter-
mined consent on a case-by- case basis. 145 As indicated by the Court, a
state may constitutionally mandate such informed consent for any
other medical procedures as well as for abortion. 146
By 1982, abortion foes, testing Danforth's outer limits, urged a
number of states and municipalities to pass informed consent stat-
utes. 147 For example, Ohio's new informed consent statute, at issue in
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,148 specified the in-
formation that a physician must give a patient in order to qualify her
consent as "informed.'1 49 The statute required that the attending phy-
sician inform the patient that "the unborn child is a human life from
the moment of conception." 150 The statute further compelled the
physician to describe to the patient "in detail the anatomical and phys-
iological characteristics of the particular unborn child" and to tell her
that "abortion is a major surgical procedure.' 51 The statute also in-
cluded a mandatory 24-hour waiting period between the execution of
145. See id
146. See id,
147. See generally Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 419 (1982) (noting that "[1legislative responses
to the Court's decision have required us on several occasions, and again today, to define
the limits of a state's authority to regulate the performance of abortions. And arguments
continue to be made in these cases as well, that we erred in interpreting the Constitution").
148. 462 U.S. 416 (1982).
149. See Akron I, 462 U.S. at 423 (citing CITY OF AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch.
1870, § 1870.06 (1978)).
In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent, an
abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she,
and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accord-
ance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have been orally informed by her
attending physician of the following facts, and have signed a consent form ac-
knowledging that she, and the parent or legal guardian where applicable, have
been informed as follows ....
Id. at 423 n.5 (quoting CrrY OF AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B)
(1978)).
150. Id. at 423 n.5 (quoting CIY OF AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870,
§ 1870.06(B)(3) (1978)).
[T]here has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological character-
istics of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at
which time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appear-
ance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain
and heart function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external
members.
Id.
151. Id. (quoting CITY OF AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B)
(1978)).
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the patient's informed consent and the performance of the
procedure.152
The Court held these provisions violated the constitutional right
to abortion. 153 According to the Court, the informed consent provi-
sions were unconstitutional in Danforth in part because they directed
the individual physician to decide what information would be relevant
to a particular patient.154 The Ohio statute went beyond the state's
legitimate interest to inform a patient; instead, the state was impermis-
sibly attempting to persuade the patient to forego abortion. 155
In 1986, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state's efforts
to use informed consent provisions "to intimidate women into contin-
uing pregnancies." 56 Similar to the provision struck down in Akron I,
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act at issue in Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists157 specified information that
had to be made available to a woman contemplating an abortion.15 8
For example, the state-supplied printed material included anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the fetus and a list of agencies of-
152. See id at 424 n.6 (citing CITr OF AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870,
§ 1870.07 (1978)).
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one
of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with
Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have signed the consent form required by
Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing that such
time has elapsed.
Id.
153. See id. at 445.
154. See i&.
155. See id& at 443-44.
The validity of an informed consent requirement thus rests on the State's interest
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman .... It remains primarily the
responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed
to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances....
Viewing the city's regulations in this light, we believe that §1870.06(B) at-
tempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring "informed consent" beyond per-
missible limits. First, it is fair to say that much of the information required is
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to with-
hold it altogether.
Id.
156. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 759 (1986).
157. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
158. See id. at 759-60 (noting that 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a) (1982) required
"that the woman give her 'voluntary and informed consent' to an abortion. Failure to ob-
serve the provisions of § 3205 subject[ed] the physician to suspension or revocation of his
license, and subject[ed] any other person obligated to provide information relating to in-
formed consent to criminal penalties" under § 3205(c)).
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fering alternatives to abortion. 159 Other required information in-
cluded "the 'fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for
prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,"' and "the 'fact that the
father is liable to assist' in the child's support."160
According to the Court, Pennsylvania's law ran afoul of its hold-
ing in Akron I because the law was "designed 'to influence the wo-
man's informed choice between abortion or childbirth.' "'161 The
printed material was an "outright attempt to wedge the Common-
wealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the in-
formed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician. '162
The requirement that the physician provide non-medical information,
like available alternatives, was irrelevant to the medical decision that a
doctor and a patient must make. 163 Further, that kind of information
did not advance the state's legitimate interest in protecting the wo-
man's health. 64
Although the Court in Casey again declined to overrule Roe's"core" holding, it did overrule those portions of Akron I and Thorn-
burgh which dealt with informed consent provisions and twenty-four
hour waiting periods.' 65 The joint opinion of Kennedy, Souter, and
O'Connor provided three votes to overrule these provisions in addi-
tion to those justices who would have overruled (or all but overruled)
Roe.16 6
The joint opinion in Casey found that Akron I and Thornburgh
went too far in holding that the mandatory dissemination of truthful
and not misleading information was unconstitutional. 167 Three jus-
tices held that the state does have an interest in protecting potential
life and in the health and mental well-being of the woman. 168 Requir-
ing the woman to be fully informed furthers legitimates these inter-
ests, "even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for
childbirth over abortion."1 69 The Court found that Pennsylvania's in-
159. See i& at 761.
160. Id. at 760-61 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1982)).
161. Id. at 760 (quoting Akron I, 463 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)).
162. Id. at 762.
163. See id
164. See id. at 763.
165. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 887 (1992).
166. See i& (O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy, J.J., joint opinion); see id at 968-69
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in his concurring opin-
ion by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 944.
167. See id at 882.
168. See id at 871.
169. Id at 883.
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formed consent requirement was "a reasonable measure to ensure an
informed choice," and, as such, was not "a substantial obstacle to ob-
taining an abortion."' 70 Casey departed from earlier case law that, in
effect, required the state to remain neutral in its view of abortion.171
Now, the state may make a value judgment expressing a preference
for childbirth.
The joint opinion also concluded that the twenty-four hour wait-
ing period was constitutional. It was "a reasonable measure to imple-
ment the State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn." 72
Increased costs and potential delays, although "troubling in some re-
spects,"1 73 did "not demonstrate that the waiting period constitut[ed]
an undue burden.1 74 The statutory exception for medical emergen-
cies alleviated the potential health risks posed by the waiting pe-
riod. 175 Like the informed consent provision, the waiting period
demonstrated the state's preference for childbirth and limited the
physician's and patient's discretion. Under the now prevailing undue
burden test, the state may do so.1 76
Nowhere is the shift in the Court's abortion case law more obvi-
ous than in the informed consent and waiting period discussion.
Within limits, the state may, in effect, lobby the woman to elect child-
birth over abortion. 177 The state may limit discretion by imposing
some conditions that would not have withstood earlier strict scru-
tiny. 178 Further, the state may advance the interest of fetal life, not just
maternal health, even during the earliest stages of fetal
development.1 79
C. Spousal Consent and Notification
The Supreme Court has ruled on two aspects of the father's
rights in an abortion decision. In early cases, the Court examined stat-
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. The challenge to the physician's First Amendment right not
to provide information to his or her patient was quickly dismissed in the joint opinion. See
id. at 884. The Court recognized that the practice of medicine is always subject to reason-
able licensing and regulation by the State. See id.
171. See id. at 871-77; but see Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444 (stating that information dissemi-
nated for purposes of informed consent must be only to inform and not to persuade).
172. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
173. Id at 886.
174. Id.
175. See id at 885.
176. See id. at 886.
177. See id at 872.
178. See id. at 883.
179. See id. at 968 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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utes that required spousal consent. 180 Most recently, state attempts to
compel spousal notification have been challenged. 181 The Court has
rejected both efforts as a violation of Roe's core protection.
In Roe, Texas law made virtually all abortions illegal.1 82 Recogniz-
ing the potential argument in favor of a spouse's right to participate
in the decision to terminate a pregnancy, the Court explicitly reserved
judgment on the constitutionality of a spousal consent provision. 183
Three years later, in Danforth, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Missouri provision requiring that a woman se-
cure her husband's written consent during the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy, unless the woman's life was in danger.1 8 4 The Court held
the spousal consent requirement was unconstitutional.18 5
Although the Court recognized the "deep and proper concern"
of a husband and prospective father, 8 6 the Court rejected Missouri's
spousal consent requirement for two reasons.' 8 7 First, the effect of the
statute was to delegate the decision to the husband. Allowing a hus-
band to regulate a wife's choice would be inconsistent with Roe's deter-
mination that a woman has an unfettered choice to terminate a
pregnancy during the first trimester.'8 8 Second, the husband's right
could not outweigh the pregnant woman's right. As the woman is"more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy . .. the
balance weighs in her favor.' 8 9 The Court also found unpersuasive
the state's claim that the statute was intended to foster mutuality and
trust in the marriage.'9 0
In response to Danforth, the Pennsylvania legislature added a re-
quirement of spousal notification.19 1 That provision was apparently
designed to circumvent the concern articulated in Danforth that a wo-
180. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
181. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).
182. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
183. See id at 165 n.67.
184. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 85 (appendix to the opinion) (quoting H.C.S. HOUSE BiLL
No. 1211 § 3: "No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy except: ... (3) [w]ith the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the
abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of
the mother").
185. See id., 428 U.S. at 71.
186. Id. at 69.
187. See id at 71.
188. See id. at 69.
189. Id. at 71 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
190. See id., 428 U.S. at 71.
191. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 908 (1983) (appendix
to the opinion) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1990)). The statute provided:
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man's husband not be able to create an absolute obstacle to her deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy. 192 In Casey, Planned Parenthood
challenged the spousal notification provision.193 Justices Blackmun
and Stevens joined the opinion authored by Justices Souter, Kennedy,
and O'Connor' 94 to create a majority striking down the spousal notifi-
cation provision.' 95
The Court declared the spousal notification provision an undue
burden on the woman's right to choose.196 The Court dismissed the
commonwealth's argument that the provision did not create an un-
due burden because "the statute affect[ed] fewer than one percent of
women seeking abortions."197 The Court believed that spouses in well-
functioning marriages would discuss whether the wife ought to termi-
nate her pregnancy. 198 Women who would not inform their spouses
would most likely fail to do so because the pregnancy was "the result
of an extramarital affair," or because "the husband and wife [were]
experiencing marital difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of
violence."' 99 Thus, Pennsylvania's law could have put a woman at risk
of physical or emotional harm or both.200
Spousal Notice. (a) Spousal notice required.-In order to further the Common-
wealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship and to pro-
tect a spouse's interests in having children within marriage and in protecting the
prenatal life of that spouse's child, no physician shall perform an abortion on a
married woman, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she
has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman
upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that
she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any
false statement made therein is punishable by law.
lM2
192. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
193. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
194. See id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); see id. at 911-14 (Stevens,
J., concurring and dissenting)..
195. See id
196. See id at 892-93 (citing the lower court's findings that the notification provision
would adversely affect abused women).
197. Id. at 894.
198. See id at 892-93.
199. Id. at 892.
200. See id at 893-94. The Court went on to discuss the delicate balance between a
woman's right to choose and her husband's right to know of that choice. It is an "ines-
capable biological fact that the state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carry-
ing will have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the father's." Id at 896.
After the child is born, the father of that hild does have a legally recognized interest in
that child's custody and growth; until then, the woman's rights must prevail. See id at
895-96. The Court clearly rejected the common law view of women as chattel of their
husband. See id. at 898. No longer is a woman required to advise her husband and obtain
his permission before exercising her own personal choices. See id. The Court expressed a
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D. Parental Consent and Notification
The abortion issue most frequently addressed by the Supreme
Court involves the rights of minors and their parents. 20 1 While states
have attempted a variety of restrictions, the Supreme Court has con-
tinued to follow the basic structure first articulated by the Court in
1976 in Bellotti v. Baird,20 2 upholding parental consent and notifica-
tion provisions as long as the state provides for alternative procedures
in some cases. 203
In Danforth, although the Court recognized that minors do not
always receive the same constitutional protections as adults20 4 and that
states have broad authority to regulate conduct of minors,205 the
Supreme Court found a "blanket" parental consent requirement un-
constitutional.20 6 Under Missouri law, any unmarried minor had to
secure the consent of one parent before she could terminate her
pregnancy. 20 7 The Court rejected the state's asserted interest in safe-
fear of the infamous "slippery slope" in that first we require notice of abortion, then notice
of birth control use, then women would be required to get permission to drink alcohol,
and so on. See i&
201. The Court has considered a total of 10 cases regarding parental notification or
consent: Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti II]; Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976) [hereinafter Belotti 1]. In stark contrast, the Court has only considered two
cases regarding spousal rights: Danforth and Casey, and, only two cases regarding regulation
of abortion methods: Danforth and Akron I. Twenty-four hour waiting periods have only
been reviewed by the Court on two occasions: Akron I and Casey. The issue of informed
consent has only been before the Court four times: Danforth, Akron I, Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and Casey. Finally,
statutes which prohibit public funding for abortions have only been reviewed by the Court
four times: Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
202. Bellotti , 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
203. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 147.
204. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
205. See id& at 74-75.
206. See id at 74.
207. See id at 85 (appendix to opinion) (quoting H.C.S. HOUSE BILL No. 1211, § 3(4)).
The statute provided:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of preg-
nancy except... (4) [w] ith the written consent of one parent.., if the woman is
unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by
a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.
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guarding the family unit and parental authority.20 8 The "veto power"
created by the requirement was unlikely to advance the state's asserted
interests. 20 9 The Court did imply that a state might tailor its law more
closely to its legitimate interests. 210
In Bellotti I, the Supreme Court distinguished Massachusetts's pa-
rental consent law from the consent law involved in Danforth.211 Massa-
chusetts provided for a judicial bypass "for 'good cause shown,"' 212
whereby a minor, unable to secure the consent of one of her parents,
could petition the court for the right to terminate her pregnancy. 213
However, no clear parental consent doctrine emerged because the
Court did not determine whether the statute was nonetheless uncon-
stitutional as an undue burden on a minor's right to obtain an abor-
tion.214 Conflicting interpretations of the statute made it uncertain
whether the statute would be upheld.215 Thus, according to the Court,
the district court should have abstained from ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the statute pending a definitive ruling by the Massachu-
setts courts.216
Three years later, the Court reviewed the same controversy.21 7 In
Bellotti v. Baird,218 the Court concluded that a blanket provision re-
208. See id. at 75.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976).
212. Id. at 134-35 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch.112, § 12P (West 1974)).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 146.
215. See id. at 148. The first interpretation protected minors from arbitrary refusal of a
parent's consent. On the one hand, the interests of the minor were protected because a
parent should only consider the minor's best interest when deciding whether to consent.
See id. at 144. On the other hand, if a minor could demonstrate sufficient maturity she
could obtain a judicial bypass without parental counseling. See id. Finally, under the first
interpretation, a minor's interests were protected because even a minor determined to be
legally immature could obtain judicial consent if the judge believed the abortion would be
in the minor's best interests. See id at 145. The second interpretation suggested that the
parents were empowered with influence comparable to a veto because of the burdensome
nature of the judicial bypass. See id. at 146.
216. See id. at 146.
217. See Betlotti I, 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.112, § 12S
(West Supp. 1979)). The statute provides:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent
of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent,
consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary....
Id. (alteration in original).
218. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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quiring all minors to obtain parental consent was unconstitutional. 21 9
Justice Powell's plurality opinion concluded that for a parental con-
sent statute to survive, the state must provide an alternative procedure
whereby the minor can obtain the necessary authorization. 220 The by-
pass must allow the minor to show either that she is sufficiently ma-
ture to make the decision independently of her parents or that the
abortion would be in her best interest.221 The state must also guaran-
tee an expeditious decision and the minor's anonymity. 222 While some
aspects of the Massachusetts statute complied with the plurality's crite-
ria, the Court found that two sections of the law violated Roe.22 3 First,
the law did not allow the minor to petition the court without first
giving notice to her parents. 224 Second, the law also allowed ajudicial
veto of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion. 225
Two years later, in H.L. v. Matheson,226 the Court upheld a Utah
parental notification provision.227 Since the plaintiff did not allege
that she was an emancipated or mature minor, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to a minor who was "liv-
ing with and dependent upon her parents," who was "not emanci-
pated by marriage,"228 and who had made "no claim or showing as to
her maturity or as to her relations with her parents."229 The Court
held that although a state may not constitutionally impose a "blanket,
unreviewable power of parents to veto their daughter's abortion" deci-
sion, 230 a "'mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate the
constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor."231 Since the
Utah law did not create a parental veto over the minor's decision and
did provide for a judicial alternative, the Court upheld the law.23 2
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, 233 underscored that the
Court left open whether a statute violates a minor's constitutional
219. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
220. See id. at 643.
221. See id. at 643-44.
222. See id at 644.
223. See id at 651.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
227. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
228. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 407.
229. Id,
230. Id. at 409.
231. Id (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979)).
232. See id. at 413.
233. See id. at 413-20 (Powell, J., concurring).
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rights if it does not allow the adolescent to avoid parental notification
where that notification would not be in the minor's best interests.234
After Matheson, in a string of decisions between 1983 and 1990,
the Court reviewed a number of state statutes that attempted to limit a
minor's right to an abortion. 235 The Court upheld the laws, even if the
laws required parental consent,2 36 provided they allowed for judicial
bypass, whereby a minor could demonstrate that she was sufficiently
mature or, alternatively, that terminating the pregnancy would be in
her best interest.2 37 The increasing split among the Justices became
notable. No single justice could secure a majority for an entire
opinion.23 8
Twice during the 1980s and 1990s, the Court has produced clear
majorities in cases involving minors and parental consent require-
ments. 23 9 In Casey, seven justices agreed that Pennsylvania's provisions
governing parental consent were constitutional.2 40 While the Court
found parts of the law did impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose,241 the consent provision, requiring the informed con-
sent of one parent, was upheld because the law provided for adequate
judicial bypass procedures. 242 In Lambert v. Wicklund,243 a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act.244
The act requires the physician provide a minor's parent(s) with forty-
eight hours' notice prior to performing the abortion.2 45 The Montana
law allows a minor to seek a judicial waiver of this notice require-
234. See id. at 420 ( Powell, J., concurring).
235. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Akron II, 497 U.S. 502
(1990); Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983);
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
236. See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983).
237. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93.
238. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see also Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
239. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
240. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900 (O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., joint opin-
ion); see also id, at 944, 971 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Thomas and White, J.J.).
241. See id, at 895. The spousal notification provision is an undue burden because "it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." Id.
242. See id. at 899. "Under these precedents [Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983); Akron II,
497 U.S. 502, 510-19 (1989); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643-644 (1979)], in our view, the
one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass procedure are constitutional." Id.
243. 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
244. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 299.
245. See id& at 293 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-204 to -212 (1995)).
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ment.246 Measured against the requirements established in Bellotti II,
the act withstood constitutional challenge. 247
Despite some disagreement concerning the burden imposed by
particular statutory schemes, 248 the legal principles governing paren-
tal consent and notification have remained consistent over the past
twenty years. 249 A majority of justices have consistently upheld state
statutes that call for parental consent or notification as long as the
statute offers an alternative procedure for a minor to obtain an abor-
tion.250 Those procedures must meet the criteria established in Bellotti
I. Specifically, a judicial bypass must be confidential and expedi-
246. See id.
247. See id In addition to guaranteeing a minor's anonymity and an expeditious han-
dling of her petition, Montana's judicial bypass provision directed the court to grant the
petition if it found any one of the following conditions: "(i) the minor [was] 'sufficiently
mature to decide whether to have an abortion'; (ii) 'there [was] evidence of a pattern of
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse' . . . ; or (iii) 'the notification of a parent or guardian
[was] not in the best interests of the [minor].'" Id. at 294 (quoting Morr. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-20-212(4), (5) (1995)). It was argued that the third provision was unconstitutionally
narrow because, as written, the provision did not require the authorization of a waiver
whenever an abortion was determined to be in the minor's best interests. See id. at 297-98.
Rather, the provision required a minor to demonstrate that notification would not be in
her best interests. See id& The critical question, then, was whether the second condition
satisfied the Bellotti II requirement that a minor be allowed "to bypass the consent require-
ment if she establishe[d] that the abortion would be in her best interests." Id. at 295; see
also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979). The Court relied on its analysis in Akron II in
which the Court upheld a substantially similar bypass provision by equating the require-
ment that a minor show notice was not in her best interests with one requiring a minor to
show an abortion, without notice, was in her best interests. Lambert, 520 U.S. at 295-96
(citing Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 (1989)). Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's reasoning
because it suggested a minor must show that an "abortion without notification is in her
best interests." Lambert, 520 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Justice Ste-
vens, if a minor had already shown an abortion would be in her best interests, it may follow
that notice would not be in her best interests. Id at 301 n.*. This is so because a minor who
is opposed to the notice requirement could be deterred from seeking an abortion which a
court had already determined to be in her best interests. See id. at 302 n.*. Furthermore,
Justice Stevens pointed out that under the plain language of the statute, if a minor could
show notification was not in her best interests, she would not be required to further show
that an abortion would be in her best interests. See id at 302. Thus, either showing satisfied
the conditions of the Montana provisions and met the Bellotti II requirement. See id
248. See, e.g., Akron II, 497 U.S. 509, 527 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing
the statutory scheme as an "obstacle course" for minors to complete before they can exer-
cise their rights).
249. See, e.g., Beflotti I, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
250. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, J.J., joint opin-
ion); see id at 944 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and
White and Thomas, J.J.).
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tious.251 It must also allow a mature minor to show that she is capable
of making an informed decision without parental guidance, or failing
that, that an abortion would be in her best interest.252
E. Use of Public Funds, Employees, and Facilities
The Supreme Court has addressed the use of public resources for
abortion services in three contexts. First, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether states could legally deny Medicaid assistance for non-
therapeutic abortions under Title XIX.253 Second, the Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which prohib-
ited the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse recipients for the costs of
abortions. 25 4 Third, the Court examined a Missouri state regulation
that prohibited performance of abortions by public employees and
that banned the use of public facilities for abortion procedures.255
The Court has consistently ruled in favor of legislation that limits
abortion funding.256
1. Medicaid Assistance for Non-Therapeutic Abortions Under Title
XIX
In 1977, the Court examined three cases challenging the validity
of state-imposed restrictions on Medicaid assistance for abortion serv-
ices.25 7 In each case, the Court held that the state's interest in encour-
aging childbirth was sufficiently compelling to justify the
restriction. 258
In Beal v. Doe,259 the Court considered whether Title XIX re-
quired states to fund non-therapeutic abortions. Title XIX directed
participating states to "establish 'reasonable standards . . . for deter-
mining . . . the extent of medical assistance"' which are consistent
with Title XIX's objectives. 260 The Pennsylvania regulation limited
251. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 294-95; see also Akron II, 497 U.S. at 512; Bellotti II, 443 U.S.
at 644.
252. See Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983) (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44).
253. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 440 (1977).
254. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
255. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989).
256. See Beal 432 U.S. at 445-47; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1976); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507.
257. See generally Beal, 432 U.S. at 438; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464; Poelker, 432 U.S. at 519.
258. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 446-47; Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-80 (1977); Poelker, 432 U.S. at
521; Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-08.
259. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
260. Bea, 432 U.S. at 441 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
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Medicaid assistance to "medically necessary" assistance. 261 The Court
found that Title XIX gives the states broad discretion when it allocates
Medicaid funds.262 According to the Court, Pennsylvania's restriction
was reasonable because the commonwealth had a valid interest in pro-
tecting human life throughout a woman's pregnancy. 263 Thus, the re-
striction was reasonable within the meaning of Title XIX. Had the
regulation not recognized an exception for medically necessary abor-
tions, it may have violated the act.264
The grant of certiorari in Beal was limited to that statutory ques-
tion. 265 The Court considered whether a regulation favoring child-
birth over abortion violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
in Maher v. Roe,266 a companion case to Beal.267 In Maher, the plaintiffs
challenged a Connecticut regulation similar to that in effect in Penn-
sylvania which limited abortions to those deemed medically
necessary.2 68
The Court determined that the district court erred when it held
abortion was a fundamental right and subjected the regulation to
strict scrutiny.269 Instead, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding
that indigence is not a suspect classification, which included indigent,
pregnant women. Therefore, the district court should have deter-
mined only whether the state had a rational basis for imposing the"medical necessity limitation" of Medicaid spending.2 70 The Court
held that the state's time-honored interest in protecting potential life
was sufficient tojustify the regulation. 271 The failure to fund non-ther-
apeutic abortions was not equivalent to a direct interference with the
right to have an abortion protected by Roe.2 72
Poelker v. Doe,2 7 3 the third case in the trilogy, upheld a directive
issued by St. Louis's mayor which prohibited the use of public re-
261. Id.
262. See id. at 444.
263. See id. at 445-46.
264. See id. at 444 (stating that if the regulation had not recognized an exception for
medically necessary abortions "serious statutory questions might be presented").
265. See id. at 443-44.
266. 432 U.S. 464 (1976).
267. See Maher, 432 U.S. 467, 470 (1977).
268. See id at 466-67.
269. See id. at 471.
270. See id. (stating that the court "has never held that financial need alone identifies a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis") (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973)).
271. See id. at 478.
272. See id. at 474.
273. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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sources for abortion services.274 The Court found that Maher con-
trolled the issue. 275
2. The Constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment
In 1976, Congress adopted a ban on the use of federal funds for
abortion services with limited exceptions. 276 Harris v. McRae277 chal-
lenged the constitutionality of that ban.2 78 The Court relied on Maher
and rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to the Hyde Amendment on the
grounds that it interfered with a Fifth Amendment due process 279
right to an abortion.2 80 The denial of public assistance is not
equivalent to interfering with the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy.2 81 The Hyde Amendment 282 was more restrictive than the state
regulations upheld in Bea1283 and Maher.284 The Hyde Amendment
did not create a general exception for medically necessary abor-
tions.285 This made no difference to the Court's analysis. 286 Instead,
the fact that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion does not
imply an affirmative right to government funds in furtherance of that
choice.287 As in Maher, the Court rejected the argument that a court
must subject "selective subsidization" of some medical procedures to
274. Poelher, 432 U.S. at 521.
275. See id.
276. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
277. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
278. See id at 301-02.
279. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that "[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law").
280. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
281. See id at 317 n.19 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 474 n.8 (1977)).
282. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 302 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926).
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the
victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to
a law enforcement agency or public health service.
Id.
283. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977).
284. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
285. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
286. See id
287. See id at 317-18. Appellees argued that the Hyde Amendment violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the amendment incorporated Roman Catholic Church doctrines
into the law. See id. at 319. Appellees also challenged the amendment on the basis that it
violated the Free Exercise Clause because a "woman's decision to seek a medically neces-
sary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs under certain Protestant or Jewish
tenets." Id. The Court dismissed both First Amendment challenges on the basis that
although the Hyde Amendment coincides with Roman Catholic doctrines, its primary pur-
pose is the allocation of public money. See id at 319-20. Thus, because the law's primary
[Vol. 34
THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY
strict scrutiny. 288 The Hyde Amendment did not affect a constitution-
ally suspect classification and was rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective. 289
3. Public Employees and Facilities
In 1989, a divided Court upheld a Missouri statute which prohib-
ited public employees from performing abortions and banned the use
of public facilities for non-therapeutic abortion services. 290 By a 5-4
vote, a majority of the Court upheld those provisions.291 The majority
found the restrictions to be within the Court's analysis in Maher and
Poelker.292 That is, the state law did not impose an obstacle to procur-
ing an abortion. Insofar as the Missouri statute reflected a preference
for childbirth, the Court found this a permissible state interest.293
F. Generalizations
After twenty-five years of litigation and significant changes in the
make-up of the Court, some general principles have remained con-
stant. Despite Presidents Reagan's and Bush's aggressive efforts to
reshape the Court for the specific purpose of overruling Roe,2 9 4 the
Court continues to recognize a woman's fundamental right to abor-
tion.2 9 5 That right, however, is limited when the state has a sufficiently
important competing interest.296 While a majority of the Court has
abandoned the trimester framework, 297 the woman's interest remains
strongest in her first trimester and diminishes over time. Viability is
the moment when the state's interest in protecting life is most
compelling. 298
The Court has always recognized that a state may-and ought
to-assure a woman's informed consent prior to an abortion.299 Over
purpose is secular, neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, it does not violate the First
Amendment. See id.
288. Id. at 321-22.
289. See id. at 322-23.
290. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-09 (1988).
291. See id. at 498, 511.
292. See i. at 508-09.
293. See id at 508-09.
294. See discussion supra Part II.A.
295. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter, J.J., joint opinion).
296. See discussion supra Parts II.A and B.
297. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
298. See discussion supra Part II.A.
299. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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time, the Court has abandoned its insistence on state neutrality be-
tween abortion and childbirth. 30 0 It now allows the state to express a
preference for childbirth by requiring health care providers to give
women seeking an abortion information designed to persuade them
to give birth rather than to terminate a pregnancy.30 1 The Court will
uphold such measures provided they do not amount to an undue bur-
den on the woman's right to choose.30 2
The Court has consistently prevented states from imposing either
a spousal consent or spousal notification requirement.30 3 A consent
requirement is,. in effect, a third party veto in conflict with a woman's
right to choose. A notification requirement cannot be justified by any
of the asserted state interests.3 04
In contrast, the Court has consistently upheld parental consent
and notification provisions as long as those laws contained basic pro-
tections.30 5 Specifically, the Court requires a guarantee of judicial by-
pass for mature minors or when consent or notification are in conflict
with the minor's best interests. 30 6
Finally, the Court has consistently upheld provisions that deny
the use of public resources for abortion procedures. 307 Essentially lib-
ertarian in its view,308 the Court has determined that the state and
federal governments cannot interfere with a woman's right to choose,
but governments also cannot be compelled to provide funds for her to
obtain an abortion.30 9
m. Reliance on Polls
Supreme Court justices and commentators, who criticize Roe and
other decisions as being anti-majoritarian, argue that legislation is the
measure of democracy. Thus, when the Court overturns legislation, it
is acting contrary to popular will.310 If one assumes that legislation
reflects majoritarian sentiment, one cannot doubt this conclusion.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See discussion supra Part II.C.
304. See id&
305. See discussion supra Part II.D.
306. See i&.
307. See discussion supra Parts II.E.1-2.
308. See TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1345-47 (criticizing the Court's position).
309. See discussion supra Parts II.E.1-2.
310. See discussion supra Part II.
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However, legislation does not always reflect majoritarian sentiment 311
as reflected in public opinion polls. Polls, of course, have limitations.
This section reviews some of those limitations. In the final analysis,
however, this article uses polling data because they are the only mean-
ingful way to measure popular sentiment. Further, despite obvious
flaws, polls that produce similar responses over time suggest some
measure of accuracy.
A. Limits of Polling Data
The mass media is addicted to polling data and about 75% of
Americans-polled, of course!-believe that opinion polls are a good
thing.312 At best, public opinion polls are a rough measure of majority
sentiment. All polls suffer from some flaws, including sampling errors,
design errors, non-availability rates, and refusal rates.313 Among other
problems, questions may be poorly worded or placed in a bad
sequence.3 14
Pollsters routinely report sampling error; that is, they report the
percentage margin of error in a given sample.315 However, more sub-
stantial problems may undercut the value of any given poll. The most
significant errors, perhaps, relate to the form, wording, and context of
survey questions.316 Complex issues pose difficult problems for poll-
sters. If the issue is complex, the typical question asking whether one
favors or opposes a stated position is a poor measure of that person's
opinion.317
As observed by one commentator, "results of a survey vary signifi-
cantly with rather inconspicuous changes in wording and format."318
For example, in a 1985 survey on abortion, the pollster asked three
different questions. The first question was: "What do you think about
abortion? Should it be legal as it is now, legal only in such cases as
saving the life of the mother, rape or incest, or should it not be per-
mitted at all?" 31 9 The second question asked: "Which of these state-
311. See discussion supra Part I.C.
312. SeeAlva Stewart, Public Opinion Polls: Benefits and Dangers: A Brief Checklist, in PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION SERIES: BIBLIOGRAPHY # P 2641 at 2 (1989) (stating that "three out of four
Americans believe opinion polls are a good thing").
313. See i& at 3-4.
314. See id.
315. See MICHAEL WHEELER, LIES, DAMN LIES, AND STATISTICS 272-73 (1976).
316. See Stewart, supra note 312, at 3-4.
317. See WHEELER, supra note 315, at 279-80.
318. Id. at 282.
319. HERBERT ASHER, POLLING AND THE PUBLIC, WHAT EVERY CITIZEN SHOULD KNOW 98
(4th ed. 1998).
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ments comes closest to your opinion? Abortion is the same thing as
murdering a child, or abortion is not murder because a fetus isn't
really a person." 320 The third question asked: "Do you agree or disa-
gree with the following statement? Abortion sometimes is the best
course in a bad situation."321
One would predict that if a majority favored abortion in question
one, a majority would also conclude that abortion is not murder. How-
ever, the responses contained some surprises: 40% supported abor-
tion and wanted it to remain "[I]egal as is now," while 40% said it
should be "[1]egal only to save mother, rape or incest."322 Hence, 80%
concluded that abortion ought to be available under some circum-
stances. At the same time, 55% agreed that abortion is "the same thing
as murdering a child .... ,323 Also somewhat surprising is that only
66% agreed that abortion is sometimes the best course in a bad situa-
tion,324 while 80% answering the first question approved the law as is
or a law allowing abortion to save the mother or to terminate a preg-
nancy resulting from rape or incest. 325
Those results suggest obvious inconsistencies. It is possible that a
number of people believe abortion is appropriate even though they
think it is murder. However, other factors may explain what appear to
be inconsistent results. The poll does not take into account the possi-
bility that respondents may not have thought carefully about their
own beliefs. Similarly, presumably 14% of those responding believe
that abortion should be permitted under certain circumstances but do
not believe that a person choosing to have an abortion is making the
best decision in a bad situation.
People seeking to use polling data can draw different inferences
from the responses. Highlighting answers to the second question al-
lows one to argue that a majority of respondents must have doubts
about abortion because they believe that abortion is equivalent to
murder. Focusing on that question ignores other evidence which indi-
cates that significant majorities favor abortion under certain
circumstances.32 6
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id
325. See id.
326. See THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, 33 (poll results accumulated from
1975-1996 showed a range of 75-84% favor legal abortion in at least some circumstances).
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Another possible explanation for inconsistent responses may be
that the respondents may not be sufficiently informed to be stating"genuine opinions," but only "nonattitudes."327 Polling the unin-
formed measures little that is meaningful. For example, some pollsters
have designed questions that ask respondents about their views on
Supreme Court decisions. 32 8 At best, such a question measures the
limited information the respondent may have about the Supreme
Court decision as reported in mainstream media. This information
can be notoriously incomplete or inaccurate.3 29
Most of the criticisms of polling data focus on problems that arise
with specific polls. As demonstrated by extensive social science litera-
ture, properly designed and interpreted, polls are meaningful. 330 The
millions of dollars spent on polling demonstrate more than mere faith
in polling; rather, well designed measurement instruments do gener-
ate significant results. 331
IV. The Polling Data and Court Doctrine
This section reviews the public opinion polling data332 over the
past twenty-five years that have attempted to measure public views on
questions relating to abortion and compares that data with the
Supreme Court doctrine developed in Part III of this article. Consis-
tent with this article's hypothesis, the data show significant agreement
between Supreme Court doctrine and public opinion.
327. ASHER, supra note 319, at 28.
328. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1986 49 (1986) (re-
producing Survey # 261-G, originally released Feb. 20, 1986). "The U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that a woman may go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any time during the first three
months of pregnancy. Do you favor or oppose this ruling?" Id See also GEORGE GALLUP, JR.,
THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1989 20 (1989) (reproducing Survey #GO 89024, origi-
nally released Jan. 22, 1989). "In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot place
restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy.
Would you like to see this ruling overturned, or not?" Id
329. See Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, 74JUDICATURE, 322,
327 (1991) (discussing the fact that a high level of public awareness of Supreme Court
cases does not mean that its rulings are accurately perceived).
330. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLi-
rIcs 246-48 (1993).
331. See id
332. This research attempts to identify the major opinion polls that focus on the abor-
tion question. The Gallup Organization has regularly polled public opinion on abortion
and those results are generally well regarded. Hence, these polls receive special attention
in this section.
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A. A Right to Abortion
1. The Polls Show That Majority Will and Court Doctrine Are in
Agreement
Prior to 1975, the year Gallup began its annual survey, the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center ("NORC") conducted two significant
polls, in 1965 and 1973. 3 3 Both NORC polls demonstrated over-
whelming support for abortion under some circumstances. In 1965,
for example, 73% of those polled agreed that abortion should be
available if a woman's health was in danger; 59% and 57% supported
a woman's right to abortion in a case of rape or serious birth defect,
respectively.3 34 Public opinion did not support an unrestrained right
to abortion. Fewer than a quarter of those polled supported abortion
in cases that might be characterized as elective abortions.335
By 1973, the year Roe was decided, 91% of those polled supported
abortion in cases of necessity for maternal health, 81% in cases of
rape, and 82% in cases of birth defects. 336 A majority favored the right
to abortion in cases where low income necessitated the decision. 337 A
plurality supported a woman's right to abort in cases where the wo-
man was unmarried and did not want children. 338
After 1975, the most reliable data comes from the Gallup Organi-
zation. The standard questions did not provide particularly subtle
measurements of public opinion. The standard questions asked
whether abortion should be legal under any circumstances, under cer-
tain circumstances, or illegal under all circumstances.3 3 9 The results of
these polls, taken throughout the post-Roe era, indicate that an over-
333. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 330, at 249.
334. See id at 250.
335. See id. Elective abortions are those undergone for reasons of "convenience," rather
than for medical reasons. A woman who decides that a child would interfere with her
career is having an elective abortion. If she chooses to have an abortion because the preg-
nancy would have a detrimental effect on her physical or mental health, it would be char-
acterized as medically justified. The term "convenience" is used to distinguish between
these two types of abortions. It is not used with intent to trivialize the abortion decision. See
also note 352 infra.
336. See The General Social Survey 1973, July 1973, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1980 171 (1980) (re-
producing the results of Survey # 159-G, originally released Aug. 28, 1980); GEORGE GAL-
LUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1981 116 (1981) (reproducing the results of
Survey # 173-G, originally released May 31, 1981); GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL,
PUBLIC OPINION 1983 140 (1983) (reproducing the results of Survey # 217-G, originally
released July 31, 1983).
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whelming majority of Americans polled support abortion, at least
under certain circumstances. 340 For example, in 1975, 21% supported
abortion under any circumstances and 54% under certain circum-
stances. 34' In 1977, the numbers were 22% and 55%; in 1980, 25%
and 53%; in 1983, 23% and 58%; and in 1989, 29% and 51%.342 In
1990 and 1992, 31% supported abortion under any circumstance and
53% supported it under certain circumstances; in 1996, the numbers
were 25% and 58%. 343
In 1978, Gallup also asked a series of questions intended to mea-
sure respondents' views of abortion during different trimesters. The
data suggest that support for a woman's right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy decreases over the course of the pregnancy.344
Other Gallup polls attempted to frame questions about abortion
rights differently. For example, in 1981, pollsters asked whether the
respondent approved of the Supreme Court ruling that any woman
can end her pregnancy during the first three months.345 Approxi-
mately equal numbers approved and disapproved the ruling.346 In
1983, 50% approved of the ruling, while only 43% disapproved. 347 In
1986, approval went down to 45%, while disapproval rose to 45%.348
In 1989, 57% opposed overruling Roe in response to a slightly differ-
ent question: "In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot
place restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion during the first
three months of pregnancy. Would you like to see this ruling over-
turned, or not?" 3 4 9
2. Interpreting the Opinion Polls
Some of Roe's critics cite public opinion polls to suggest that the
public does not support the Supreme Court's abortion rights case law.
The authors of Between Two Absolutes, for example, note that both pro-
340. See id.
341. See THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 33.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, July 31, 1983, at 13941 (reporting the results of
Survey # 217-G).
345. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1981 112 (1981).
346. See THE GALLUP RE:ORT, Jan./Feb., 1986, at 18 (asking: "The U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled that a woman may go to a doctor to end a pregnancy at any time during the first
three months of pregnancy. Do you favor or oppose this ruling?") The results showed that
45% favored the ruling, 45% opposed the ruling and 10% had no opinion. See id.
347. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1983 139 (1983).
348. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1986 49 (1986).
349. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBULC OPINION 1989 20 (1989).
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choice and pro-life advocates claim that polls support their respective
positions. 350 They observe that "neither the pro-life nor pro-choice
movement has the support of an absolute majority of Americans."3 5 1
Public attitudes over time have remained remarkably stable. A major-
ity has "hovered near allowing abortion" in four of six circumstances
best described as "traumatic circumstances," and between one and two
circumstances best described as "elective circumstances. '352
Other authors have found a "strong division in public opinion on
abortion," 353 based on data collected over a ten-year period. These
authors relied on responses to a NORC poll, asking whether a married
woman ought to be able to obtain a legal abortion if she does not want
any more children.35 4
Roe does give a woman greater freedom in choosing an abortion
than the public seems to support. At some points in time, public ac-
ceptance of abortion has seemed virtually identical to the protection
afforded by Roe.355 However, while most of the polls indicate that the
public would not support a choice based simply on convenience, 356
Roe does not allow the state to inquire into the reason for a woman's
choice. That is, while Roe suggested that some limitations may be im-
posed during the second trimester, her choice during the first trimes-
ter is unfettered. 357 Subsequent case law left observers wondering
whether a state could impose any significant limitations during the
second trimester.3 58 At a minimum, the Court does not allow a state to
force a woman to justify her choice. This leaves her free to choose an
abortion for convenience.
Focusing on the area of disagreement between public opinion
and the broad right protected in Roe ignores significant areas of agree-
ment. For example, when Roe was decided, a majority of people polled
350. See COOK ET AL., supra note 33, at 37.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 35-37 (defining traumatic circumstances as: "mother's health, fetal defect,
and rape . . ." and elective or "social" circumstances defined as: "poverty, unmarried wo-
man, or a couple who wants no more children").
353. JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 64, atl2-13.
354. See id. at 13 (asking: "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible
for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any
more children.").
355. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1980 171-174 (1980).
356. See e.g. Public Generally Supports a Woman's Right to Abortion, THE GALLUP POLL
MONTHLY, Aug. 28, 1996, at 32 (finding that only 32% of those polled would support legal
abortions in cases where the family cannot afford more children).
357. See discussion supra Part II.A.
358. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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favored the liberalization of abortion laws.3 59 Numerous polls since
that time demonstrate that the overwhelming majority favors more lib-
eral abortion rights than those prevailing prior to Roe.360
Further, while a majority may not favor the precise rights af-
forded in Roe, only a small percentage of those polled would have
abortion forbidden outright.361 For example, in 1988, 17% urged that
abortion be illegal under all circumstances.362 Twenty-four percent fa-
vored no restrictions on abortion. 363 Of the remaining 57% (those
favoring abortion under certain circumstances), an overwhelming ma-
jority favored abortion if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest,
or would create a severe health hazard. 364 Sixty percent favored the
right to abortion in a case in which the baby would be deformed.3 65
When added to those who favored abortion under any circumstances,
about 65% of those sampled favored a right to abortion if the child
would be born deformed. 366
3. Legislation on Abortion Is Often Anti-Majoritarian
Comparing public opinion with Supreme Court decisions tells
only part of the story. When the Court's critics attack the Court as
elitist or as anti-majoritarian, they compare the Court with the ideol-
ogy of the political branches of government. 367 However, if one com-
pares the Court's holding in a case like Roe with positions taken by the"representative" branches of government, the Court's performance
looks closer to public opinion than does that of many elected officials.
For example, in 1981, President Reagan, perhaps as a courtesy to
the Christian Coalition that helped him win the presidency,3 68 sup-
ported the Helms-Hyde Human Life Bill.3 69 Typical of a number of
359. See Maris A. Vinovksis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate
Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1750, 1755 (1979).
360. See id. at 1753-54.
361. See THE GALLUP MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 33 (finding that no more than 22% fa-
vored an outright ban of abortion in 20 polls conducted between 1975 and 1996).
362. See id
363. See id
364. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1988 208-09 (1988)
(reporting on a survey released in October 1988 which found that 85% of respondents
approved of legal abortions in cases of rape or incest, and 94% approved of legal abortions
if the mother's life is endangered).
365. See id.
366. See id. at 206-08.
367. See supra notes 3, 33, 63 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
369. S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong. (1981); see alsoJOHNSON & CA-
NON, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the 1980 presidential campaign).
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bills submitted to Congress in the early 1980s, 370 the Human Life Bill
contained a provision designed to limit federal court access to plain-
tiffs bringing certain kinds of cases involving specific federal rights.3 7 1
Section 1 of the Human Life Bill also attempted to overrule Roe372 by
providing that "actual human life exists from conception. '" 373
Had the Human Life Bill been adopted, its proponents hoped
that the Court would defer to Congress's determination of when
human life began,374 an issue that the Court was unable or unwilling
to decide in Roe.3 75 Although the effect of the Human Life Bill was
debated, section 1 would almost certainly have extended due process
liberty protection to the fetus.3 76 Were the fetus entitled to due pro-
cess protection, not only would Roe be overruled but the Human Life
Bill would also have destroyed the states' ability to legalize abortion.377
This is so because a state law allowing a woman to choose abortion at
any time in her pregnancy would implicate the fetus's liberty interest,
an interest which could not be denied without due process. Taking a
370. See Baucus & Kay, supra note 24, at 992 n.18 (listing several bills on issues such as
school prayer and abortion which would have limited the jurisdiction of federal courts).
371. See S. 158, 97th Cong., § 2 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 2 (1981) (providing
that no inferior Article III court "shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment" in any case involving state
or local laws limiting the right to an abortion); see also Michael Vitiello, Congressional With-
drawal of Jurisdiction from Federal Courts: A Reply to Professor Uddo, 28 Lov. L. REv. 61, 61-63
(1982) (noting that the effect of section 2 of the Human Life Bill was to limit the initial
determination of the constitutionality of abortion legislation to state courts).
372. See S. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981) (defining, for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the beginning of human life); see also Vitiello, supra
note 371, at 62 (finding that the Human Life Bill would overrule Roe in substance because
it extended the constitutional protection of liberty to the fetus).
373. S. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981).
374. See Uddo, supra note 33, at 1088 (asserting that the Supreme Court "has, in the
past, allowed Congress to differ with it on determinations relevant to the [F]ourteenth
[A] mendment by deferring to the congressional view").
375. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (explaining that the Court will not
resolve the question of when life begins because "[w]hen those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer").
376. See Vitiello, supra note 371, at 62.
377. See S. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981) (stating that
"for the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment not to deprive persons of life without due process of law, human life shall
be deemed to exist from conception").
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fetus's life without some compelling competing interest simply cannot
be squared with due process.378
Some efforts by state legislatures would have resulted in similar
restrictions. For example, legislation at issue in Webster included a pre-
amble that promised protection for fetal life from the moment of con-
ception.3 79 The Missouri statute included legislative findings that the
"life of each human being begins at conception" and that "[u] nborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being. '" 380
Had the Court upheld the preamble, the statute would have had an
effect similar to that of the Human Life Bill.
Examples like these, hardly unique in the abortion controversy,
demonstrate that elected officials have often acted in direct contra-
vention of majority sentiment.381 By contrast, the Supreme Court's
long-standing affirmation of Roe's core holding has been supported in
whole or in large part by significant majorities of those polled. 38 2 This
is demonstrated by various polls that have asked whether the person
interviewed favored a decision to overrule Roe383 or to enact a consti-
tutional amendment which would make abortion illegal.38 4
4. Where Court and Public Opinions Do Not Agree
Insofar as poll results are not entirely consonant with Roe, the
pollsters have seldom attempted to refine their questions to measure
whether those polled would subscribe to the Supreme Court's precise
holding in Roe in light of other plausible alternatives. For example,
most of the Gallup polls suggest that a majority of those polled do not
favor abortion as a matter of "convenience," but do if the mother's
health, including psychological health, is at risk.3 85
378. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (maintaining that only a compelling state interests can
justify abridging a fundamental right, such as a fetus's right to life, which was recognized at
conception under the Human Life Bill).
379. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504 n.4 (1988) (citing
Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986)).
380. I.
381. SeeJoHNsoN & CANON, supra note 64, at 151; see also discussion supra note 96.
382. See supra notes 333-49 and accompanying text.
383. See Larry Hugick, Abortion: Majority Critical of Abortion Decision, But Most Americans
Favor Some New Restrictions, THE GALLUP REPORT, July 1989, at 5, 8 (reporting that 58% were
opposed to overturning the Court decision in Roe); see also David W. Moore et al., Public
Generally Supports a Woman's Right to Abortion, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 29,
35 (reporting that 59% opposed a constitutional ban on abortion).
384. See Vinovkis, supra note 359, at 1761 (reporting that in 1976, 32% of the voters
surveyed favored a constitutional amendment making abortion illegal while 56% opposed
such an amendment).
385. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.1.
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However, if Roe were curtailed to reflect this view, implementa-
tion would impose practical problems. For example, would the physi-
cian have to discuss with the woman the basis of her decision to
determine whether she was making her choice simply out of conven-
ience or because her mental health was at risk? Would the physician
be bound by a woman's stated reason? Or, for example, if a woman
asserted that her psychological health was at risk, could the physician
refuse the abortion because the physician doubted her explanation?
Or if a woman stated that she could not afford additional children, a
reason that a majority might not support, could a physician nonethe-
less perform the procedure because the physician believed that the
woman's mental health would be adversely affected if she did not have
the abortion? Or would the decision be taken out of the hands of the
physician entirely? In other words, a scheme that would parallel ma-
jority sentiment might impose other impediments that would lead a
majority to reject the regulation. Upon closer examination, Roe might
be the best compromise.
The Supreme Court has modified Roe in ways that allow the states
to influence a woman's choice on abortion. In early cases, the Court
limited the kind of information that a state could require as part of an
informed consent provision.386 In effect, the Court required that a
state remain neutral in its position towards a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy and could not "intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies. '38 7 More recently, the Court has found that a state has a"profound interest in potential life," and may take measures "to per-
suade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion."38 8 Under Casey,
a state is free to discourage abortions for convenience. 38 9 In fact, a
state may even attempt to discourage abortions in situations where a
majority of Americans believe that the woman's right ought to be un-
fettered. For example, a majority favors an unfettered right to an
abortion when the child may be born with a deformity. However,
under current Court doctrine, the state is free to discourage the
mother from electing an abortion in this circumstance.
Despite the assertions by critics, the Court has not deviated widely
from majoritarian sentiment. In fact, by comparison to the policies of
386. See discussion supra Part II.B.
387. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 759 (1986).
388. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 545 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
389. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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Presidents Reagan and Bush and to some legislatures, 390 the Court has
held a steady course that, over time, closely mirrors the sentiment of a
majority of Americans.
B. Informed Consent and the Twenty-four Hour Waiting Period
Polling data concerning the related issues of informed consent
and a twenty-four hour waiting period are illuminating. Initially at
odds with popular sentiment, the Court's view has moderated towards
popular opinion.
From the beginning of its abortion case law, the Supreme Court
has upheld informed consent provisions-at least where those provi-
sions leave to the physician the decision of what information to com-
municate. 391 In addition, it has upheld the twenty-four hour waiting
period as "a reasonable measure to implement the State's interest in
protecting the life of the unborn." 39 2 Pollsters have extensively mea-
sured the public's support for an informed consent requirement and
a twenty-four hour waiting period. The results have been consistent
over time, with a large majority favoring these kinds of require-
ments. 393 For example, in 1992, 86% of those responding to a Gallup
poll favored a requirement that a doctor inform a patient of the alter-
natives to abortion prior to the procedure. 394 The percentage favoring
such a requirement remained the same in 1996.395
With regard to a twenty-four hour waiting period, Gallup polls
reveal support ranging from 73 to 74% approval ratings. 396 Other
390. See supra notes 367-84 and accompanying text.
391. See discussion supra Part II.B.
392. Casey, 476 U.S. at 885.
393. Compare Larry Hugick & Lydia Saad, Abortion: Public Support Grows for Roe v. Wade,
THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 5, 7 (reporting that 86% favor a law requiring
doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before performing the procedure;
73% favor a law requiring women seeking abortions to wait 24 hours before having the
procedure done), with David W. Moore et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 86%
favor a law requiring doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before per-
forming the procedure; 74% favor a law requiring women seeking abortions to wait twenty-
four hours before having the procedure done).
394. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 86% favor a law requir-
ing doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before performing the
procedure).
395. See Moore, et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 86% favor a law requir-
ing doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before performing the
procedure).
396. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 73% favor a law requir-
ing women seeking abortions to wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure
done); see also Moore, et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 74% favor a law
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polls have produced similar results. In 1989, the Gordon S. Black Cor-
poration found that 63% favored a twenty-four hour waiting period
while only 28% opposed this. 397 In 1992, Times Mirror found 81% in
favor of such a limitation.39 8 In 1994, the Yankelovich Organization
found that 73% favored a twenty-four hour waiting period before a
doctor can administer RU-486, the "morning after" pill. 39 9 In 1998, a
CBS News-New York Times poll found that 79% of those polled favored a
twenty-four hour waiting period for women seeking an abortion. 400
Hence, as the Court's early rulings on these issues were not sup-
ported by majority sentiment,40 1 those rulings did not survive later re-
consideration by the Court. Today, the Court's holdings are in accord
with popular sentiment on the questions of informed consent and a
mandatory waiting period.40 2
C. Spousal Notification and Consent
A major area of disagreement between Supreme Court doctrine
and public opinion is that of spousal consent and notification. For
over twenty years, the Court has rejected statutes imposing either
spousal consent or notification provisions, while significant majorities
of those polled support such requirements. 40 3
Gallup polls during the 1990s found at least 70% of those polled
favored spousal notification. 40 4 Lesser-known polls have reported simi-
lar findings. A 1989 Gordon S. Black poll found that 63% of those
polled favored a state law which would require spousal notification. 40 5
requiring women seeking abortions to wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure
done).
397. See Gordon S. Black, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 26, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
398. See People, The Press & Politics Campaign '92, May 8, 1992, Public Opinion Online,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
399. See Time, CNN, Yankelovich Partners Inc., May. 20, 1994, Public Opinion Online,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
400. See CBS News, New York Times Poll, Jan. 15, 1998, Public Opinion Online, available
in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
401. See discussion supra Part II.B.
402. See discussion supra Part II.B.
403. See discussion supra Part II.C.
404. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 73% favored a law re-
quiring that the husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an abor-
tion); see also Moore et al., supra note 383, at 29, 35 (reporting that 70% favored a law
requiring that the husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an
abortion).
405. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, July 5, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
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Six months later, the same group found that 57% of those surveyed
supported such a law. 40 6 Other groups, both those with ties to the
Right to Life movement and those without ideological ties, have also
found that a significant majority favor spousal notification. 40 7
Perhaps more surprising, at least two polls have found majority
support for a law that would require spousal consent as well. A 1989
Los Angeles Times poll found that 53% of those sampled favored such a
requirement.40 8 A similar Washington Post poll conducted in 1992
found that 63% favored spousal consent as a precondition for an
abortion. 409
The disparity between Supreme Court doctrine and public opin-
ion over spousal rights is significant and has not changed over time.
However, it is the only area of significant disagreement that has re-
mained consistent over time.
D. Parental Notification and Consent
Not long after Roe, the Supreme Court struck down Missouri's
blanket parental consent requirement.410 The Court suggested the
state might tailor a parental consent law to serve legitimate interests in
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority.411 Since then, the
Court has reviewed numerous state laws regulating a minor's right to
have an abortion. The Court has upheld the law in question, whether
it involved parental consent or merely notification, as long as the law
provided for a judicial bypass for certain minors. 412
Gallup has found consistent support of about 70% for a parental
consent requirement. 413 Those findings have been replicated by nu-
406. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, Dec. 26, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
407. See Wirthlin Group, Jan. 1992, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, RPOLL File (reporting that 74% favored a law requiring a woman's husband be
notified before an abortion is performed). Wirthlin Group is a full service research pro-
vider founded by Richard Wirthlin. Wirthlin's most notable clients are former President
and California Governor Ronald Reagan as well as The National Right to Life Committee.
He is widely recognized as one of the best Republican pollsters in the country today.
408. See Los Angeles Times, March 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Mar-
ket Library, RPOLL File.
409. See Washington Post, April 1992, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, RPOLL File.
410. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
412. See discussion supra Part II.D.
413. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 70% favor a law requir-
ing women under 18 to get parental consent for any abortion); see also Moore et al., supra
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merous groups.4 14 Almost all of the polls have found support for a
requirement of parental consent to run close to or above 70%;415 only
a 1990 poll found support under 60%, but even there, 57% of those
polled supported a parental consent requirement. 4 16
Whether the Supreme Court doctrine and polling data are en-
tirely .consistent is open to debate, the reason being that the pollsters
have not attempted to measure whether those polled would support
the judicial bypass exception. This should not, however, obscure the
fact that the Court has upheld parental consent laws, a holding that
receives overwhelming public support.
E. Use of Public Funds
Pollsters have come to inconsistent results in efforts to measure
public opinion about public funding of abortions. While the Supreme
Court doctrine has consistently rejected the argument that govern-
ment has an obligation to fund abortions,417 public opinion has varied
depending on the wording of the question asked.
A number of major polls seem to agree with Supreme Court doc-
trine. For example, one Gallup poll found that 54% favored a state's
right to prohibit abortions "in public hospitals unless the abortion is
required to save a woman's life." 418 A Los Angeles Times poll reported
that 56% favored that part of the Webster decision which upheld a
state's right to impose such a prohibition. 419 Another Los Angeles Times
poll found that 54% of those polled opposed a reformed health plan
that would provide funding for abortions.420
By contrast, a number of polls have found that a majority oppose
laws which would ban public hospitals from performing abortions. A
note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 74% favor a law requiring women under 18 to get
parental consent for any abortion).
414. See People, The Press & Politics Campaign '92, May 8, 1992, Public Opinion Online,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File; American National Election Study 1992,
April 1993, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File; Time,
CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 5, 1990, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS,
Market Library, RPOLL File.
415. See id.
416. See Time, CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 5, 1990, Public Opinion Online,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
417. See discussion supra Part II.E.
418. Hugick, supra note 383, at 5, 10 (reporting that 54% favored and 43% opposed a
law not allowing abortions to be performed in public hospitals).
419. See Los Angeles Times, July 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, RPOLL File.
420. See Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1993, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, RPOLL File.
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1989 USA Today poll reported that 51% of those questioned opposed
such a prohibition, while 44% supported the suggested ban.42' A simi-
lar poll concluded that 64% of the sample opposed a legal restriction
which would prohibit "abortions from being performed in all public
hospitals and clinics."422 Finally, a CBS News-New York Times poll found
that 57% opposed a prohibition against public employees or public
hospitals from performing abortions.423
A possible explanation for the inconsistent results is that the
questions used in the various polls frame the issue differently. For ex-
ample, some of those responding to the CBS News-New York Times poll
who opposed a limitation on abortions being performed in a public
hospital may have answered differently if they had been asked
whether they supported a requirement that public hospitals dedicate
resources to providing abortions. Neither the 1998 USA Today poll nor
the CBS News-New York Times poll focused on the fact that requiring a
public hospital and public employees to perform abortions requires
the local government entity to fund those abortions. Had the ques-
tions been framed so that this premise could be understood, inconsis-
tent results may not have been produced.
Conclusion
The focus of this article has been on one criticism leveled at the
Supreme Court: that its activism, in the words of Robert Bork, "is
likely to represent an elite minority's sentiment."424 This article has
attempted to determine whether the Court's abortion doctrine is in
fact anti-majoritarian. Quite to the contrary, the data suggest that
Supreme Court case law in large part reflects majoritarian sentiment.
In recent years, conservatives have renewed a time worn attack on
the Court that it is anti-majoritarian. 425 In the words of one critic, the
Court is a "regular participant in the 'culture wars' that divide Ameri-
cans on so many social issues. And in these ongoing conflicts, the
Court is a systematic partisan for one side-the liberal side. '42 6 That
kind of powerful rhetoric can cast doubt on the Court's legitimacy
421. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, July 5, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
422. Time, CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 10, 1989, Public Opinion Online,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
423. See CBS News, New York Times, July 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
424. BoR, supra note 3, at 17.
425. See discussion supra Part I.A.
426. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 105.
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and has at times led to a call for limitations on the power of federal
courts.
Sustained attacks on the Court's legitimacy may undercut the
Court's ability to do substantial justice in otherwise unpopular cases.
The traditional defense of the Court, that it was intended to protect
"discrete and insular minorities," has its limitations. Over time, the
public will not continue to support a court that repeatedly frustrates
popular will.427
While the Constitution was never intended to create a system of
direct democracy, it built in significant limitations that prevent Article
III courts from becoming politically unaccountable. Article III creates
an independent judiciary with the ability to do justice in individual
cases. At the same time, the political branches of government can in-
fluence the direction of the Court through the appointment
process.428
Comparison of the Supreme Court's abortion case law with doz-
ens of public opinion polls spanning twenty-five years demonstrates
that the Court has not abandoned the majority in favor of a political
elite. In almost every area, Court doctrine and public opinion show
significant similarity. In fact, public opinion and Supreme Court doc-
trine have often shown far greater similarity than do the views of the
Court's critics.
427. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 283.
428. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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